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Abstract: The capability approach to human development, proposed by Amartya 
Sen and others, is now a prominent perspective within welfare economics and 
development economics. I argue that the capability approach, like Post Keynes-
ianism, can be situated within the Cambridge economic tradition, a tradition 
grounded on classical economics, and characterized by an ontological focus on 
themes such as openness and uncertainty, and by a common social philosophy. 
Furthermore, I argue that the capability approach and Post Keynesianism can 
be seen as complementary and mutually enriching approaches.
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Amartya Sen’s capability approach is, at a general level, part of an 
older tradition within practical reasoning (of which welfare economics 
and the study of human behavior are particular branches) that, as Sen 
(1999, p. 289) argues, goes back to Aristotle. However, whereas Sen’s 
general contribution (especially his analysis of well-being) is strongly 
influenced by an Aristotelian account of human functioning, Sen’s study 
of economic behavior is greatly inspired by Adam Smith. In fact, Putnam 
(2002) and Walsh (2000; 2003; 2008) consider this return to Smith as 
the central aspect of Sen’s project. According to Putnam and Walsh, the 
twentieth century witnessed a revival of classical economic thought in 
two stages.
The first stage came through Piero Sraffa (1960), who was concerned 
with bringing back David Ricardo’s analytical framework. The second 
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stage of this revival of classical economic thought underpins Sen’s writ-
ings, which are much influenced by Smith’s conception of the human 
agent, in which the latter is driven by a complexity of ethical motivations 
and moral sentiments, and not just by utility optimization as in neoclas-
sical economics.
In this paper, I argue that it is not only in Sen’s and Sraffa’s contri-
butions that we find a revival of classical economics, but in the whole 
Cambridge economic tradition, to which Sen and Sraffa belong. The 
Cambridge tradition is characterized by an ontological focus on themes 
such as openness and uncertainty, by a common social philosophy, and a 
return to classical economics, features that contrast with the neoclassical 
perspective in important ways.
The coherence of projects within the Cambridge tradition such as Post 
Keynesianism has been much debated by authors such as Arestis (1996), 
Davidson (2003–4; 2005), Dow (1992; 2005), Hamouda and Harcourt 
(1988), Harcourt (1981; 2003), Harcourt and Kerr (2003), King (2002; 
2005), Lavoie (2005), Lawson (1994; 1999; 2003), Pratten (1999), and 
Sawyer (1988). Authors such as Backhouse (2006) or Medema (2007), 
on the other hand, have been preoccupied with the Cambridge “welfare” 
tradition, which starts with Henry Sidgwick, and has Alfred Marshall and 
Arthur Pigou as key figures.
The coherence of these two different traditions with each other, and 
of leading figures such as Marshall, John Maynard Keynes, and Sraffa, 
was already discussed by authors such as Harcourt (1981; 2003), who 
devoted much time to the study of the Cambridge economic tradition. 
In this paper, I intend to extend this discussion to the analysis of Sen’s 
capability approach, which can be taken to be a continuation of the 
Cambridge “welfare” tradition, which goes from Sidgwick to Sen, and 
scrutinize its relationship to the other Cambridge tradition—namely, the 
Keynesian tradition.
Of course, the coherence of the Cambridge tradition is a most controver-
sial topic, as the debate concerning the differences between the Sraffian 
tradition and other Post Keynesians shows.1 In this sense, there would 
be some advantages in discussing only the relationship between Sen and 
Post Keynesianism, instead of addressing the topic of the Cambridge 
tradition here. However, Sraffa is included among the several Cambridge 
economists that Sen acknowledges as key influences (see Klamer, 1989; 
1
 See, for example, Davidson (2003–4; 2005), Dequech (2007–8), Dow (2005), 
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Sen, 2003), so a complete assessment of Sen’s contribution, and of its 
relation to Post Keynesianism, will not be complete without considering 
Sraffa, and the whole Cambridge atmosphere in which Sen started his 
academic work.
The Cambridge economic traditions
One can roughly identify two traditions of economic thought in Cam-
bridge, which can be named as the Cambridge “welfare” tradition (for 
recent studies of this tradition, see Backhouse, 2006; Medema, 2007)
and the Cambridge “Keynesian” tradition (for an overview of which, see 
Harcourt, 2003; Harcourt and Kerr, 2003; Pasinetti, 2005). The former 
tradition can be traced back to Sidgwick, and it underpins the work of 
economists such as Marshall and Pigou.
The authors of the Cambridge “welfare” tradition were mainly con-
cerned with the impact of economics on human well-being. Marshall 
and Pigou (and also authors such as Dennis Robertson, James Meade, 
and Tony Atkinson) can be situated in the neoclassical subdivision of 
the Cambridge “welfare” tradition, to which Keynes, and later Sen, also 
belonged but quickly abandoned.
The capability approach, and Sen’s critique of contemporary neoclas-
sical economics, and of the limited view of economics it provides, can 
be seen as a continuation of the Cambridge “welfare” tradition, if we 
take a broader view of such tradition, as a perspective preoccupied with 
the characterization of human well-being where the latter need not be 
defined only in terms of utilities, as in neoclassical economics.
Keynes (1936) famously rejected the neoclassical branch of the Cam-
bridge “welfare” tradition in which he had been brought up, and initiated 
the Cambridge “Keynesian” tradition, which includes, in addition to 
Keynes, economists such as Richard Kahn, Roy Harrod, Joan Robinson, 
Austin Robinson, and Nicholas Kaldor. Authors such as Sraffa (and his 
followers) can be said to constitute a subdivision of their own, because 
unlike Keynes, they keep Ricardo as their main influence (for different 
reasons, Michal Kalecki and his followers could also be said to constitute 
yet another branch of the Cambridge Keynesian tradition). Keynes, on 
the other hand, argues that the origins of his approach can be traced back 
to the Cambridge classical economist Thomas Robert Malthus, and the 
latter’s arguments against Ricardo, and against Say’s law.
However, Sraffa was very close to the Keynesian circle, in the same 
way that Sraffian authors remained very close to the other Cambridge 
Keynesians, for example, during the Cambridge Capital Controversy, 
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which opposed economists of Cambridge University such as Robinson, 
Sraffa, Luigi Pasinetti, or Pierangelo Garegnani, to American economists 
based in Cambridge, Massachusetts, such as Paul Samuelson or Robert 
Solow.2 Nevertheless, there are important differences between Sraffians 
and other Post Keynesians, which will be addressed below. Of course, 
the Cambridge Keynesian tradition went beyond England, and the Post 
Keynesian tradition is now well established in the United States, too, 
through the work of authors such as Paul Davidson, Jan Kregel, Hyman 
Minsky, and Sidney Weintraub, among many others.
The Cambridge tradition and classical economic thought
Pasinetti (2005) notes that one of the key characteristics of the Cambridge 
school of Keynesian economics is its inspiration in classical economic 
thought, in opposition to the marginalists and neoclassical thought. Other 
prominent economists associated with Cambridge, such as Garegnani 
(1984; 2002), also stress this opposition between classical economics and 
the marginalists, and place their approach closer to classical economics. 
This inspiration in classical economic thought, such as the critique of 
neoclassical theory, constitutes a strong similarity between the Cambridge 
Keynesian tradition and Sen’s contribution.
In fact, the Cambridge “welfare” tradition, too, is closely associated 
with classical economics. Its authors were sympathetic toward classical 
economics, too, from Sidgwick (an admirer of John Stuart Mill) to Sen 
(much influenced by Smith). Even the neoclassical branch of the Cam-
bridge “welfare” tradition is more connected to classical thought than 
most neoclassical authors, and the dominant neoclassical perspective 
inspired in Leon Walras. Thus, Marshall, the most prominent author of 
the neoclassical branch of the Cambridge “welfare” tradition, regards 
many aspects of classical theory as appropriate for long-run analysis, and 
considers that the neoclassical perspective went too far in emphasizing 
the role of utility-driven demand over the (relatively neglected) classical 
explanation of prices in terms of cost of production.
Bringing classical economic thought back seems thus to be a domi-
nant tone in the Cambridge traditions. Of course, each branch of the 
Cambridge traditions emphasized different classical authors. Keynes 
regarded Malthus as an inspiration to his work, and strongly disagreed 
with Ricardo. But Sraffa, on the other hand, was especially influenced by 
2
 For an overview of this controversy, started with Robinson (1953), see Bliss et al. 
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Ricardo—although as Pratten (1999) notes, authors such as Garegnani 
prefer to see Sraffa’s work as a revival of classical thought in general. 
Sen (1999) notes how his perspective is inspired by Smith, but is often 
unsympathetic toward Malthus, and was never an enthusiast of Ricardo’s 
analytical framework. Other members of the Cambridge “welfare” tradi-
tion, such as Sidgwick and Marshall, are much influenced by Mill.
But these disagreements between authors of the Cambridge traditions 
are actually another similarity with classical economic thought, for they 
are a continuation of the discussions that took place between classical au-
thors themselves—for example, the famous exchanges between Ricardo 
and Malthus. These exchanges were essential to the pluralism and the 
dialectic of classical economic thought, and continued to be fundamental 
to the atmosphere lived in Cambridge.
Furthermore, the grounding of the Cambridge tradition in classical eco-
nomics also distinguishes it from other economic traditions. Effectively, 
central authors of the “old” institutional tradition such as Thorstein Veblen 
(1898) considered classical economics to be pre-Darwinian, naturalistic, 
and thus inadequate, and John Kenneth Galbraith (1958) argued that the 
existence of affluence, a phenomenon that classical economists (placed 
in a world characterized by scarcity) did not foresee, renders classical 
economics less adequate for the analysis of the contemporary world. 
The classical origins of the Cambridge tradition also distinguish it from 
Austrian economics, the roots of which can be found in the work of the 
marginalist Carl Menger.
The classical origins of the Cambridge tradition also explain its 
similarities with the Marxian tradition. In fact, Karl Marx was strongly 
influenced by classical economic thought, and authors such as Smith and 
Ricardo (Schumpeter, 1992, argues that Ricardo was the key influence), 
who inspired Cambridge economists such as Sen and Sraffa, respec-
tively. Furthermore, like the Cambridge tradition, Marx also provided a 
conception where economics and philosophy are closely interconnected, 
and Marxian analysis is permeated by a strong social concern that, as we 
will see in the next section, is another central feature of the Cambridge 
tradition.
Moreover, Marx is often identified by Post Keynesians as one of the 
central inspirations of this tradition, and Sen notes that “I have got more 
joy out of reading Smith than anyone else,” but he adds “Marx comes very 
close to it” (quoted by Klamer, 1989, p. 141). Effectively, Sen’s initial 
work was greatly influenced not just by the Cambridge economists Sraffa, 
Robertson, and Robinson (and in India, by Amiya Dasgupta) but also by 
the Cambridge Marxist author Maurice Dobb. As Pratten (1999) noted, 
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Garegnani also argued that Sraffa was bringing back a classical tradition 
that included Marx, whose work Sraffa (and Garegnani) considered to 
be in many respects one of the highest points of analytical development 
of classical thought. 
Of course, there are also some differences between Marxian economics 
and the views of some authors of the Cambridge tradition. Keynes saw 
his own theory as a significant advance over Marx’s—whose work he 
thought to be considerably dated—and many Marxist authors would not 
agree with Sen’s (1999) perspective on the role of the market, which is 
grounded on an economic argument defending the economic efficiency 
of markets, and an ethical argument according to which the freedom of 
exchange provided by the market is morally valuable by itself. Sen’s 
(ibid.) defense of the role of the market in development processes seems 
closer to the analysis of Austrian economists such as Friedrich Hayek, 
than to Marxian analysis, or at least the orthodox interpretation of the 
latter. In any case, the relationship between the Cambridge tradition and 
Marxian economics surely deserves further elaboration.
The social philosophy of the Cambridge tradition
Another central theme uniting the Cambridge traditions is their social 
philosophy. Pasinetti (2005) noted that a strong social concern is one 
of the central features of the Cambridge school of Keynesian econom-
ics. This strong social concern also underpins the Cambridge “welfare” 
tradition (including Sen’s capability approach), which has been much 
concerned with human well-being. Furthermore, this strong social con-
cern comes combined with a similar social philosophy that underpins 
the contributions of many authors of the Cambridge traditions, such as 
Keynes and Sen.
One can argue that even though Sen does not provide a fully fledged 
theory of development, he does nevertheless provide the basic underpin-
nings for such a theory. The central presupposition for such a theory is 
that the redistribution of capabilities, freedom, and social welfare are 
not only ends to be achieved but also the means to promote well-being 
and advancement.
Sen (1999) noted how health and education sectors are relatively labor 
intensive. Because wages are lower in developing countries, sectors such 
as health and education have a cost structure in those countries that is 
relatively cheaper comparatively to that of developed countries, thus 
facilitating the implementation of social policies in developing countries. 
Furthermore, policies oriented to redistributive social goals concerning 
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sectors such as education, health, or emancipation, by improving human 
capital and human capabilities, also foster economic growth and human 
development, releasing in turn more resources to be applied in promot-
ing those social goals.
In this sense, for Sen, it is a fallacy to say that first there must be inequal-
ity and lower social achievement in order to achieve economic growth, 
and that only after an economic growth similar to that of developed 
countries is attained can one apply social policies. Developing countries 
require a lower level of economic growth than developed countries for 
the adoption of social policies (due to a cheaper cost structure), and the 
latter are essential to the formation of human capital, which is typically 
lower in developing countries.
Now, the principle behind this idea—that is, that social goals such as 
redistribution of capabilities are both an end and a means to develop-
ment—is very close to the conclusion Keynes takes from his own theory. 
In fact, Keynes believed that his theory led to a radically different social 
philosophy, which is strikingly compatible with, and complementary to, 
what Sen advocates in his capability approach.
As noted by Thirlwall (2002, 2003), developing countries typically 
face a constraint in demand which undermines their economic growth. 
Keynes (1936) argued that when there is the need to expand demand, 
income distribution should favor those with less income, because those 
have a higher marginal propensity to consume, and thus favoring them 
will stimulate aggregate demand. So Keynes’s theory provides an 
economic mechanism that again shows how social policy (in this case 
concerning income distribution) is both an end and a means for growth 
and development, in line with the perspective Sen came to advocate later. 
Keynes considers this principle to be fundamental to his social philoso-
phy. Hence, there is a strong similarity between the social philosophy 
of the capability approach and that which Keynes argued was to follow 
from his own theory.
Furthermore, the capability approach and Post Keynesianism work 
at different levels of abstraction. Sen’s capability approach has been 
mostly concerned with the nature of development, but without provid-
ing a theory of growth and development (see Martins, 2006, 2007a, 
2007b). The Post Keynesian tradition, on the other hand, has made 
central contributions to growth theory (see, for example, Harrod, 1939, 
1948; Kaldor, 1960, 1978) while addressing extensively issues such as 
growth and development (see, for example, Pasinetti, 1993; Thirlwall 
2002, 2003), but lacks a general conception of development processes. 
By working at different levels of abstraction, both perspectives can be 
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seen as complementary and mutually enriching in the study of develop-
ment processes.
Of course, the question arises as to whether there is any other common 
ground that justifies joining Sen’s capability approach and Post Keynes-
ianism together, other than geographical origin, historical pedigree (and 
their classical roots), a similar social philosophy, and the existence of 
complementarities between both approaches. I will now argue that the 
ontological and methodological underpinnings of the Cambridge tradi-
tions also reveal many common features.
Ontology and the Cambridge traditions
Another similarity between the capability approach and Post Keynesian 
economics springs from their ontological underpinnings. It has been sug-
gested that the coherence of the Post Keynesian project ultimately lies at 
an ontological level, and not at the level of substantive theory.3
In fact, Lawson (2006) argued that although mainstream economics 
is characterized by an insistence on the ubiquitous use of mathematico-
deductive methods (which mainstream economists believe to be essential 
for economics to become a scientific discipline), the essence of heterodox 
approaches consists in being ontologically oriented (rather than being 
defined in terms of method as mainstream economics), with each het-
erodox tradition focusing on a specific theme.
Post Keynesian economists typically focus on uncertainty and histori-
cal processes, Austrian economists emphasize the intersubjective nature 
of knowledge and its impact on the market process, “old” institutional 
economists are mostly concerned with causes of change and causes of 
stability in economic processes (among which technology and institutions 
play a key role), and Marxian economists focus on the contradictions 
and dynamics of the capitalist process.
But the distinguishing feature of each heterodox tradition, such as Post 
Keynesianism, Austrian economics, institutional economics, and Marx-
ian economics, springs from an enduring concern with the ontological 
nature of each of the latter issues—that is, uncertainty, intersubjectivity, 
causes of stability and change, and the contradictions of the capitalist 
process, respectively, rather than the particular substantive theories each 
tradition uses when studying these issues.
3
 See Lawson (1994, 1999, 2003). For a discussion on the coherence of Post 
Keynesianism, see also Arestis (1996), Dow (1992), Hamouda and Harcourt (1988), 
and Sawyer (1988).
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Within the spirit of Lawson’s (ibid.) proposal for distinguishing het-
erodox traditions in terms of the ontological aspects of reality they focus 
on, we can find that a key feature of the Cambridge tradition seems to 
be its emphasis on the open nature of the social realm. That is, due to 
the existence of fundamental uncertainty, strict, even regularities of the 
form “if event X then event Y” are not ubiquitous in the social realm, 
as would be the case in a closed system (see also Lawson, 2003, for 
elaborations).
Uncertainty plays a key role in the writings of Keynes, and in the 
Post Keynesian tradition.4 This ontological aspect was, of course, 
further elaborated outside Cambridge by authors working within Post 
Keynesianism—an example is the idea of nonergodic processes developed 
by American Post Keynesians such as Paul Davidson (1994).
The role of uncertainty, and the open nature of the social realm, is also 
important to the Cambridge “welfare” tradition. The open nature of the 
social realm is noted by Marshall (1890) when he argued that economists 
should ground their analysis on biological dynamics, and not in equilib-
rium concepts inspired in physics, such as the ones that pervade contem-
porary neoclassical thinking (for elaborations, see Pratten, 1998).
One of the reasons the social realm is an open system is that human 
beings do not always follow laws of behavior like natural phenomena, 
and always have the possibility of choice—that is, any action could have 
been otherwise, as Lawson (1997) stressed. In fact, Sen (1982; 2002) 
argued that the different motivations, goals, values, and reasons for 
choice of human agents cannot all be described by the same preference 
ordering. It follows that one cannot assume a priori that actual behavior, 
which arises out of the joint effect of these competing motivations, will 
display regularities that can be described as choice driven by one prefer-
ence ordering.
Effectively, for Sen, the multiple preference orderings that drive the 
human agent can be, and often are, incomplete, generating situations 
where there are options that are not ranked vis-à-vis each other in any 
way. Hence, in Sen’s conception of the human agent, there will often 
exist what Post Keynesians term as “fundamental uncertainty” concern-
ing which choice will be made (see Martins, 2006, for elaborations). So 
Sen’s conception of the human agent entails that social reality constitutes 
an open system.
4
 This was noted by Arestis et al. (1999), Davidson (1994), Harcourt (2003), 
Lawson (1993; 1994; 1999; 2003), Pasinetti (2005), and Runde (1990; 1991; 1994a; 
1994b).
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Another reason social reality is an open system is the existence of 
internal relations. According to Lawson:
the social realm is . . . highly internally related. Aspects or items are said 
to be internally related when they are what they are, or can do what they 
do, by virtue of the relations in which they stand. (2003, p. 17)
This ontological conception of reality is considered by Lawson (ibid.) 
to be one of the central characteristics of Post Keynesian economics, and 
as Harcourt (2003) and Lawson (2003) noted, is present in the writings 
of Keynes, who distinguishes between the cases when the whole is, and 
when the whole is not, reducible to its constituent parts:
if different wholes were subject to laws qua wholes and not simply on 
account of and in proportion to the difference of their parts, knowledge 
of a part could not lead, it would seem, even to presumptive or probable 
knowledge as to its association with other parts. Given, on the other hand, 
a number of legally atomic units and the laws connecting them, it would be 
possible to deduce their effects pro tanto without an exhaustive knowledge 
of all the coexisting circumstances. (Keynes, 1973, pp. 277–278)
As Harcourt (2003) noted, Keynes is especially concerned with the 
cases when the whole is more than the sum of the parts, due to the inter-
connectedness of social phenomena.
Sraffa’s (1926) critique of neoclassical economics, and the alternative 
system he provided (Sraffa, 1960) also stress the interconnectedness of 
the various parts of the economic system. In fact, Sraffa’s (1926) critique 
of marginal theory highlights the fact that a given market cannot be ana-
lyzed as if it were isolated from other markets, because the various parts 
of the economic system are closely interconnected.
It is important to note that although most Post Keynesians have followed 
Keynes closely in taking into account both fundamental uncertainty and 
the interconnectedness of the economic system, Sraffa and his followers 
have emphasized mostly the interconnectedness of the economic system, 
rather than the role of fundamental uncertainty.
Furthermore, as Pratten (1999) noted, in their economic theory, Sraf-
fians use the methodological assumption of closure as a first step, in 
order to then address the complexity of the economic system, which is 
nevertheless taken to be an open and interconnected system. Of course, 
the relationship between Sraffians and other Post Keynesians deserves 
further elaboration, as noted above.
The capability approach also acknowledges the interconnectedness of 
social processes. In fact, Sen argued that the study of development has to 
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take into account the complex interconnections between (instrumental) 
freedoms that include “political freedoms,” “economic facilities,” “so-
cial opportunities,” “transparency guarantees,” and “protective security” 
(1999, p. 38). For Sen, such interconnections are essential features of 
reality. As Sen argued, “[T]he capability perspective involves, to some 
extent, a return to an integrated approach to economic and social develop-
ment championed particularly by Adam Smith” (ibid., p. 294).
The interconnectedness of social processes, which implies that the part 
cannot be taken for the whole, is thus another common feature of the 
Cambridge traditions, present in the Post Keynesian emphasis on mac-
roeconomics before microeconomics (on which see Harcourt, 2003, and 
Pasinetti, 2005), and in Sen’s (1999) insistence on analyzing development 
processes in a multidimensional perspective.
Methodology and language in the Cambridge tradition
The existence of multiple debates within the Cambridge traditions, which 
parallels the exchanges of classical economists in many ways, points 
toward another central characteristic of the Cambridge traditions: the 
existence of multiple methods and languages. In fact, one would not 
expect anything else from a perspective characterized by exchanges 
and debates and concerned with the analysis of complex phenomena 
where uncertainty, openness, and interconnectedness are fundamental 
properties.
These methods and languages range from detailed statistical analyses 
to philosophical argument, present both in the Keynesian tradition and 
the Cambridge “welfare” tradition, from Sidgwick to Sen. The use of a 
plurality of methods underpins the Post Keynesian emphasis on the use 
of multiple languages (see Dow, 2005; Harcourt, 2003) but need not 
entail loss of internal consistency, which, as Pasinetti (2005) noted, is 
essential to the Cambridge Keynesian tradition but is not to be confused 
with formalism.
It also underpins the writings on the capability approach, which resorts 
to philosophical argument on one hand, and to statistical analysis and 
measurement techniques on the other hand. The concept of “rich descrip-
tion” used by Cambridge economist Dobb, who was a key influence for 
Sen (Klamer, 1989), also captures this concern with a pluralist language 
(for elaborations, see Sen, 2005; Walsh, 2000, 2003, 2008).
Pratten (2004a, 2004b) argued that an opposition toward uncritical 
mathematical formalization as the only language or method to be used 
is a key characteristic of the Cambridge economic tradition. Weintraub 
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(2004) seems to suggest that the opposition toward mathematical for-
mulation springs from the inability of many Cambridge economists to 
follow the developments in mathematics, and gives Marshall, Keynes, 
and Robinson as examples.
It can be argued, however, that the opposition to an exclusive use 
of mathematical methods springs from the difficulties that arise when 
analyzing an ontologically complex process with such methods. The 
phenomena in which Cambridge economists are interested are character-
ized by openness, interconnectedness, and uncertainty, and such type of 
phenomena can rarely (if ever) be completely understood using a single 
method, such as mathematico-deductive methods. Such being the case, 
it is only natural that a pluralist approach to methodology emerges.
In fact, to use mathematico-deductive methods in conditions under 
which they are not appropriate reveals more mathematical incompetence 
than recognizing their inadequateness under such conditions. Math-
ematical competence entails not just the ability to engage in deductive 
reasoning, but also (and perhaps especially) the capability for abductive 
reasoning (for placing ourselves outside of the deductivist structure of a 
given mathematical problem, and questioning the very axioms posited 
in such a deductivist structure), which includes the capability to assess 
the conditions under which deductivist methods are appropriate. Thus, 
competent mathematicians such as Sen, and many others in the Cam-
bridge tradition, recognize that mathematics is not a unique foundation 
for economics, because the complex reality that economic analysis deals 
with requires a plurality of methods (see Lawson, 2001).
In fact, a realist emphasis is another defining feature of the methodology 
of the Cambridge tradition, which is present both in Post Keynesianism 
(see Lawson, 1994, 1999, 2003; Pasinetti, 2005) and in the Aristotelian 
roots of the capability approach (see Martins, 2007a, 2007b; Nussbaum, 
1992, 2000, 2003; Sen, 1999, p. 289). It can even be argued that the 
methodological presuppositions of the Cambridge tradition are consistent 
with a critical realist ontology.
Critical realism in economics is a perspective on social ontology that 
has been systematized in Lawson (1997, 2003). Lawson (1999, 2003) 
argued that the methodological and ontological tenets of critical realism 
and Post Keynesianism are compatible, and that the coherence of Post 
Keynesianism ultimately lies in the adoption of a critical realist ontol-
ogy (on this topic, see also Lewis and Runde, 1999). The connections 
between critical realism and authors of the Cambridge “welfare” tradi-
tion such as Marshall have been elaborated by Pratten (1998), and the 
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similarities between critical realism and Sen’s capability approach were 
also discussed in Martins (2006, 2007b).
This realist approach constitutes thus another similarity between the 
projects of the Cambridge economic tradition. In fact, if methodological 
pluralism, which springs from an ontological concern with openness and 
interconnectedness, is a key characteristic of the Cambridge tradition, it is 
only natural that critical realism in economics, itself a project concerned 
with methodological pluralism, and explicitly ontologically oriented 
toward the study of categories such as openness or interconnectedness, 
has emerged recently in Cambridge, too (for elaborations, see Bigo, 
2006; Pratten, 2004a, 2004b).
Concluding remarks
Sen’s capability approach provides an analysis of the nature of develop-
ment but does not give us a substantive theory that explains develop-
ment processes. It was argued that Post Keynesian economics can be 
fruitfully combined with the capability approach to that effect. Because 
the capability approach and Post Keynesianism work at different levels 
of abstraction, they can be complementary and mutually enriching. This 
would also imply some interaction between the two Cambridge economic 
traditions—that is, the Cambridge “welfare” tradition and the Cambridge 
“Keynesian” tradition.
In fact, both the capability approach and Post Keynesian economics 
seem to be part of what may be called the Cambridge economic tradition. 
This tradition can be characterized by an inspiration in classical econom-
ics, a similar social philosophy, according to which the ends to human 
well-being (such as income redistribution or the expansion of human 
capabilities) are the means to it too, a realist perspective, and a focus on 
ontological themes such as openness, uncertainty, and interconnected-
ness. These topics cannot be addressed without the use of a plurality of 
methods and languages and naturally lead to the existence of not only 
plural methods and languages but also ongoing debates and exchanges, 
which are part of a continuous dialectic.
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